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AGENCY COSTS AND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
David Farber* 
 
The False Claims Act represents the U.S. Justice Department’s most 
effective tool in detecting, punishing, and deterring fraud against the 
government.  The effectiveness of the False Claims Act is due in large part 
to the law’s qui tam provisions, which provide a private right of action to 
whistleblowers who may sue fraudsters on behalf of the government in 
exchange for a percentage of the recovery.  The resulting relationship 
between the government and whistleblowers has led to increased detection 
and recoveries from corporate defendants who defraud and abuse 
government programs. 
However, these whistleblower provisions also come with social costs 
where profit-motivated private enforcers bring frivolous claims and 
overenforce.  Unlike much of the literature to date, this Note uses an 
agency-cost approach to analyze these qui tam provisions.  This approach 
allows for an exploration of the incentives created by the qui tam 
provisions, the associated social benefits and costs, and possible reforms 
that augment these benefits and reduce unnecessary costs.  Specifically, this 
Note argues that clearly defined incentives for whistleblowers and 
corporate defendants, along with a requirement that settlements be publicly 
filed and include admissions of wrongdoing, will reduce agency costs 
involved with private enforcement under the False Claims Act. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, Sherry Hunt, a veteran of the residential mortgage industry, 
accepted a position as a vice president at CitiMortgage, the residential 
mortgage unit of the Wall Street behemoth Citigroup, Inc.1  Initially, Hunt 
was in charge of a team responsible for ferreting out fraud and bad 
investments in CitiMortgage‘s correspondent lending division, which 
purchased loans originated and underwritten by third parties.2  By 2006, 
Hunt had identified serious defects in the loans CitiMortgage was 
purchasing, detailing these findings in regular reports to her supervisors.3  
In 2008, when Hunt was transferred to a quality-control group tasked with 
investigating and reporting fraud in CitiMortgage‘s Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) loan program, she uncovered more defects, including 
the widespread failure to report fraudulent loans to the government as 
required by FHA guidelines.4 
But, when Hunt brought the defects to the attention of her bosses, they 
buried her findings.5  On March 22, 2011, Jeffery Polkinghorne, a 
CitiMortgage executive in charge of loan quality, asked Hunt and a 
colleague to stay behind after a meeting.6  Polkinghorne told them that the 
 
 
 1. Bob Ivry, Blowing the Whistle on Citi, BLOOMBERG MARKETS, July 2012, at 26, 28. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 29. 
 4. Id. at 32. 
 5. Id. at 29. 
 6. Id. at 29, 34. 
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number of loans classified as defective needed to fall, or it would be their 
―asses on the line.‖7  After the alarming meeting, Hunt made the decision to 
blow the whistle on CitiMortgage.8  A week later, she disclosed the 
fraudulent practices, quality control failures, and the pressure from her 
superiors to change defect ratings to CitiMortgage‘s human resources 
department.9  On August 5, 2011, Hunt filed a whistleblower suit under the 
False Claims Act (FCA)10, detailing CitiMortgage‘s fraudulent practices 
and demanding compensation on behalf of the government for the resulting 
losses to the FHA loan program.11  In January 2012, the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) joined Hunt‘s case and CitiMortgage settled shortly 
thereafter, admitting to wrongdoing and agreeing to pay $158.3 million in a 
publicly filed settlement.12  Hunt was paid $31 million, nearly 20 percent of 
the recovery, as a whistleblower incentive for uncovering the fraud and 
bringing it to the attention of the government.13 
Sherry Hunt‘s experience is emblematic of the increasing importance of 
the FCA in combating fraud involving government funds.  The DOJ has 
dramatically increased enforcement of this civil antifraud statute in recent 
years, bringing in more than $5 billion in recoveries in 2012 alone and an 
ever-increasing share of the total fraud recoveries under both criminal and 
civil causes of action.14 
The unique advantage of the FCA lies in the whistleblower provisions 
that incentivize individuals to alert the government to fraud involving 
government funds.  Under these so-called qui tam15 provisions, private 
persons can file cases against defendants on behalf of the government, share 
in any recoveries, and engage in private enforcement of the law where the 
government elects not to pursue the case.16  While the DOJ‘s direct 
enforcement of the FCA without the assistance of whistleblowers is not 
unusual, the overwhelming majority of actions filed under the FCA are qui 
 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 34. 
 9. Id. 
 10. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Files and 
Simultaneously Settles Fraud Lawsuit Against CitiMortgage, Inc. for Reckless Mortgage 
Lending Practices (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/ 
February12/citimortgageincsettlement.html. 
 13. See Ivry, supra note 1, at 30. 
 14. See Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Nearly $5 
Billion in False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2012 (Dec. 4, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-ag-1439.html. 
 15. The term ―qui tam‖ (pronounced ―kwI tam‖ or ―kee-tam‖) comes from the Latin qui 
tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur—―who as well for the king as 
for himself sues in this matter.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1444 (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
―qui tam action‖ as ―[a]n action brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue 
for a penalty, part of which the government . . . will receive‖). 
 16. The whistleblower provisions of the FCA are found at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)–(h) 
(2012). See also infra Part I.A. 
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tam actions, and the vast majority of recoveries under the FCA are 
attributable to qui tam cases as well.17  This Note accordingly focuses 
primarily on qui tam actions filed by current or former employees of 
corporate defendants in analyzing the agency costs18 involved with the 
enforcement of the FCA‘s whistleblowing provisions. 
Agency cost theory19 provides a robust analytical framework for 
examining the advantages and disadvantages of the FCA‘s statutory 
scheme.  This theory allows for the exploration of the incentives created by 
the qui tam provisions, the associated social benefits and costs, and the 
evolutionary changes to the FCA statutory scheme that augment these 
benefits and reduce unnecessary costs.  This Note endeavors to further 
develop the previously limited analysis of the agency relationships involved 
in the FCA context.20 
Part I of this Note provides background on the FCA, including the 
relevant procedure, historical development, and aspects of qui tam litigation 
in practice.  Part II provides a primer on agency cost theory and its 
application in the corporate fraud context.  Part III analyzes the agency 
costs associated with qui tam litigation under the FCA and identifies 
distinct advantages and potential disadvantages of the FCA‘s private 
enforcer regime.  Finally, in Part IV, this Note proposes several reforms for 
the FCA from the conclusions derived from the agency cost analysis 
including the DOJ‘s adoption of clearly defined incentives for 
whistleblowers and corporate defendants, along with a requirement that 
FCA settlements be publicly filed and include admissions of wrongdoing. 
 
 
 17. From 2010 through 2013, 2614 qui tam actions were filed compared to 500 non-qui 
tam suits. See U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS – OVERVIEW 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf.  Over the same 
period, recoveries from qui tam-initiated actions represented $11.5 billion, while recoveries 
from non-qui tam actions represented $3.3 billion. See id. 
 18. Agency costs refer to the monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual loss incurred 
in agency relationships. See infra Part II.A. 
 19. See Kenneth E. Scott, Agency Costs and Corporate Governance, in 1 THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 26 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) 
(―Agency cost theory deals with the inevitable divergence of self interest between principal 
and agent, owner and manager, or employer and employee, the welfare losses thereby 
created, and the devices and institutions that have evolved to reduce those losses.‖). 
 20. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits As Monitoring 
Devices in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1806–07, 1821 (1996); 
Robert Howse & Robert J. Daniels, Rewarding Whistleblowers:  The Costs and Benefits of 
an Incentive-Based Compliance Strategy, reprinted in CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING IN 
CANADA 525, 543–44 (Ronald J. Daniels & Randall Morck eds., 1995), available at 
http://repository.upenn.edu/law_series/4/ (discussing the FCA framework using an agency 
theory perspective). 
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I.   BACKGROUND:  THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
The FCA21 is the federal government‘s principal antifraud tool, 
containing whistleblower provisions that allow private individuals to file 
suit on behalf of the government, alert authorities to fraud affecting 
taxpayer dollars, and engage in private enforcement of these antifraud 
causes of action.22  The enforcement of the FCA follows three principal 
avenues:  (1) direct enforcement by the DOJ; (2) government intervention 
in qui tam actions; and (3) private enforcement by go-it-alone qui tam 
relators.  This Note is principally concerned with the latter two avenues of 
FCA qui tam litigation. 
This section offers an overview of the FCA qui tam provisions.  Part I.A 
briefly describes the procedure for filing a qui tam action, and Part I.B 
traces the historical development of the qui tam provisions.  Part I.C then 
outlines the reality of qui tam litigation, discussing the motivations of FCA 
whistleblowers, the incidence of frivolous suits, and the issues involved 
with the resolution of FCA litigation. 
A.   Qui Tam Procedure 
Under the qui tam provisions, a whistleblower, referred to as a relator, 
initiates an action by filing a complaint under seal, on behalf of herself and 
the federal government, in the relevant federal district court.23  The relator 
must also serve the government with a copy of the operative complaint 
along with a disclosure of all other material facts concerning the 
allegations.24  The complaint remains under seal for a minimum of sixty 
days to allow for the government to investigate the relator‘s allegations and 
determine whether to intervene in the case.25  The FCA provides the DOJ 
with authority to issue Civil Investigative Demands (commonly referred to 
as ―CIDs‖)—essentially prelitigation unilateral discovery devices that may 
compel witness testimony, production of documents, and answers to 
interrogatories.26  The government can request extensions of the seal period 
for good cause,27 and these seal extensions are often liberally granted.28  As 
 
 
 21. The precursor to the FCA was first enacted in 1863 during the Civil War. See Act of 
Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.  The modern-day FCA is the product of a comprehensive 
legislative modernization in 1986. See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-562, 100 Stat. 3153.  For more recent clarifications, see Fraud Enforcement and Recovery 
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621–25. 
 22. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)–(h) (2012). 
 23. Id. § 3730(b)(1). 
 24. Id. § 3730(b)(2). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. § 3733. 
 27. Id. § 3730(b)(3). 
 28. See Laura Hough, Finding Equilibrium:  Exploring Due Process Violations in the 
Whistleblower Provisions of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, 19 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1061, 1074–75 (2011). 
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a result, FCA qui tam investigations and cases can linger for years before a 
successful resolution or dismissal.29 
Under the FCA statute, the government may pursue three courses of 
action:  (1) elect to intervene in the qui tam action and takeover the 
prosecution of the suit; (2) decline to intervene in the qui tam action and 
allow the relator to prosecute the suit on behalf of the government; or 
(3) move to dismiss the qui tam action entirely.30  The government may 
also decide to settle with the defendant prior to intervening in the case, 
usually resulting in the simultaneous filing of an election to intervene and a 
settlement between the parties.31  In cases where the government decides to 
decline intervention, a relator will often voluntarily dismiss or withdraw the 
qui tam suit.32 
B.   Historical Development 
While the FCA finds its origins in the Civil War era, it remained a 
relatively underutilized antifraud tool through most of the twentieth 
century.33  Prior to the 1986 amendments to the FCA, the law included a 
jurisdictional bar prohibiting qui tam suits based on information already in 
the possession of the government.34  In addition, the government‘s recovery 
was limited to double the damages sustained by the government, and the 
relator‘s award in an intervened qui tam action was capped at 10 percent of 
the recovery.35  This statutory framework resulted in underutilization of the 
FCA whistleblower provisions, with qui tam filings averaging roughly six 
per year by the mid-1980s.36  However, the procurement fraud scandals of 
that same decade spurred Congress to undertake a legislative overhaul of 
the FCA in 1986,37 largely responsible for transforming the FCA into the 
robust antifraud tool it is today.38  The principal aim of the 1986 
amendments was to engender more FCA suits by increasing incentives for 
 
 
 29. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection:  Invigorating Incentives for 
Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 129 
n.253 (2007). 
 30. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4), (c)(2)(A). 
 31. See U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, FALSE CLAIMS ACT CASES:  GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
IN QUI TAM (WHISTLEBLOWER) SUITS (n.d.), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/ 
Documents/fcaprocess2.pdf. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Four Signal Moments in Whistleblower Law:  1983–
2013, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 389, 392–94 (2013). 
 34. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5277. 
 35. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730(c)(1) (1982). 
 36. See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 48 (2002). 
 37. See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam 
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 561 (2000) (―In the early 1980s, the Department of 
Defense experienced a series of scandals involving excessive prices paid for items procured 
from defense contractors . . . high-profile exposés by the national media helped to generate 
pressure for Congress to amend the False Claims Act.‖); see also False Claims Amendments 
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153. 
 38. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2–3. 
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whistleblowers to come forward and file qui tam actions.39  Congress raised 
the amount recoverable from defendants under the FCA from double to 
treble damages40 and provided for higher percentage-of-recovery qui tam 
awards—up to 25 percent where the government intervenes and up to 30 
percent where the relator proceeds with the action alone.41  The 1986 
amendments also cleared up ambiguities in the statute with respect to the 
evidentiary burden and elements necessary to plead an FCA cause of action, 
expanding the ambit of a false or fraudulent claim to a wider range of 
conduct.42  The legislation substantially amended certain provisions that 
had limited the filing of meritorious claims, modifying the jurisdictional bar 
precluding suits based on information in the government‘s possession and 
allowing relators to pursue actions that the government had declined to 
prosecute.43  Raising the potential recovery, easing the burden of proving 
liability, and removing jurisdictional bars to filing suit were designed to 
encourage the filing of more qui tam actions by relators on behalf of the 
government.44 
While primarily designed to encourage whistleblower actions, several 
provisions in the 1986 amendments addressed the concerns of the DOJ and 
potential defendants who were wary that the changes would engender a 
flood of frivolous and parasitic qui tam suits.45  The 1986 amendments 
included a fee-shifting provision meant to disincentivize relators from 
bringing suits that are ―clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought 
primarily for purposes of harassment‖46 and a public disclosure provision, 
barring jurisdiction for suits based on publicly disclosed information, unless 
the potential relator was the original, voluntary source of the information to 
the government.47  Additionally, the 1986 amendments sought to encourage 
defendants to self-report fraud to the government through a reduced 
 
 
 39. Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich:  
Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 305 
(1992) (―The 1986 amendments to the FCA increase the likelihood of recovery by a qui tam 
plaintiff in several ways:  (a) by guaranteeing minimum amounts to be awarded in successful 
cases; (b) by making it easier for a plaintiff to make a successful claim; and (c) by 
potentially expanding the class of persons who may bring claims.‖). 
 40. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988). 
 41. Id. § 3730(d)(1)–(2). 
 42. Under the 1986 amendments, the burden of proof was set at a preponderance of the 
evidence standard. See id. § 3731(c).  The ―knowingly‖ scienter requirement was defined as 
acting with a ―reckless disregard‖ to the falsity or fraudulent nature of the claim presented to 
the government, requiring no specific intent to defraud. See id. § 3729(b)(1). 
 43. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 29–30. 
 44. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 39, at 336. 
 45. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 14 (―In response to Justice Department concerns, [the 1986 
amendments bill], and specifically the qui tam provision, was significantly revised . . . .‖). 
 46. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4); see also S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 16 (―As a further prevention 
of frivolous actions, the subcommittee adopted attorneys fees sanctions to be charged against 
any qui tam plaintiff who brings a clearly frivolous or vexatious suit.‖). 
 47. These so-called ―public disclosure bar‖ or ―original source‖ provisions were codified 
at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). 
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damages provision.48  Under this provision, corporations that self-report 
fraud face a maximum of double damages (as opposed to treble) and 
reduced penalties.49 
Subsequent significant amendments to the FCA came in the aftermath of 
the subprime mortgage crisis through the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery 
Act of 200950 (FERA).  These ―clarifications‖ of the FCA addressed several 
circuit court opinions that had begun to chip away at the effectiveness of the 
FCA and had limited otherwise meritorious suits from going forward.51  
Additionally, the 2009 amendments enhanced safeguards for relators, 
protecting all whistleblowing activity aimed at stopping a violation of the 
FCA, not just activity in furtherance of a formal qui tam lawsuit.52  
Congress made clear that these provisions ensure whistleblowers are 
protected from employers‘ retaliation where they report FCA wrongdoing 
internally to supervisors or compliance departments.53 
Certain amendments to the FCA‘s public disclosure bar provision were 
also included under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
201054 (PPACA).  Under the PPACA, the jurisdictional bar of the public 
disclosure provision was replaced with a mandatory dismissal provision, 
subject to opposition by the government.55  Additionally, the ―based upon 
public disclosure‖ language was removed and replaced with the phrase ―if 
substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or 
claim were publicly disclosed . . . .‖56  This language tracks the majority 
view of circuit courts in construing the previous version of the public 
 
 
 48. See id. § 3729(a)(A)–(C). 
 49. These provisions remain the same today. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2012).  To 
qualify under these subsections, the violating party must furnish all information relating to 
the violation to the government within thirty days of obtaining the information and must 
fully cooperate with the government investigation. Id. § 3729(a)(2)(A)–(B).  Furthermore, 
the government cannot have already initiated a criminal prosecution or a civil or 
administrative action, and the party cannot have actual knowledge of a current investigation 
into the violation. Id. § 3729(a)(2)(C). 
 50. Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621–25. 
 51. See S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438 
(―This section amends the FCA to clarify and correct erroneous interpretations of the law 
that were decided in Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123 
(2008), and United States ex. rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp, 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 
2004).‖). 
 52. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2012). 
 53. See 155 CONG. REC. 12,699 (2009) (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman) (―This 
language [of the 2009 amendments] is intended to make clear that this subsection [Section 
3730(h)] protects not only steps taken in furtherance of a potential or actual qui tam action, 
but also steps taken to remedy the misconduct through methods such as internal reporting to 
a supervisor or company compliance department and refusals to participate in the 
misconduct that leads to the false claims . . . .‖). 
 54. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 901–02. 
 55. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
 56. Id. 
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disclosure bar,57 and there are preliminary indications that district courts 
will follow this established public disclosure jurisprudence.58  These 
amendments from the PPACA were prompted by concerns that district 
courts were unduly limiting qui tam actions and improperly dismissing 
relators‘ suits where important information unknown to the government was 
brought to light.59 
C.   Qui Tam Litigation in Practice 
The qui tam cause of action is a unique legal tool, and the practical 
experience of FCA qui tam litigation is correspondingly a complex and 
nuanced area of law.  Whistleblowers and their counsel often face a wide 
array of concerns and motivations when contemplating a qui tam filing—
factors that may manifest in frivolous filings and overenforcement.  
Additionally, both relators and defendants are routinely required to grapple 
with unique considerations involving resolution and settlement of FCA 
cases. 
1.   Fear of Meritless Claims 
Many have criticized the qui tam provisions for an apparent 
overabundance of meritless FCA claims.60  According to DOJ statistics, the 
government has historically intervened in less than one quarter of filed qui 
tam cases.61  In those cases in which the DOJ intervenes, the recoveries are 
much higher than in non-intervened cases, presumably because the DOJ 
chooses to intervene in suits that provide a better chance of prevailing and 
involve greater damages exposure.62  Some commentators have argued that 
 
 
 57. See Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 915 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(―Under the majority view, a lawsuit is based upon publicly disclosed allegations when the 
relator‘s allegations and the publicly disclosed allegations are substantially similar.‖). 
 58. See United States ex rel. Osheroff v. HealthSpring, Inc., 938 F. Supp. 2d 724, 732 
n.10 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (―[P]re-PPACA Sixth Circuit cases are instructive regarding 
whether an allegation is substantially the same as that found in the public disclosure.‖). 
 59. See Ni Qian, Note, Necessary Evils:  How to Stop Worrying and Love Qui Tam, 
2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 594, 611–12. 
 60. See, e.g., Oversight of the False Claims Act:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution and Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014) 
(statement of David W. Ogden, Partner, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, U.S. 
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform) (―In most . . . [qui tam] cases, the government declines 
to intervene, typically deeming them unworthy of government lawyers‘ time.‖); Christopher 
M. Alexion, Open the Door, Not the Floodgates:  Controlling Qui Tam Litigation Under the 
False Claims Act, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 365, 404 (2012) (―Evidence of parasitic qui tam 
actions is alarming.‖); Christina Orsini Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public 
Interest:  An Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 964 (2007) (―Data on the rates of 
intervention in false claims actions appear to indicate that the qui tam provision of the FCA 
leads to a significant number of frivolous suits.‖). 
 61. See Broderick, supra note 60, at 971. 
 62. See Michael Rich, Prosecutorial Indiscretion:  Encouraging the Department of 
Justice to Rein in Out-Of-Control Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False Claims Act, 76 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1263 (2008). 
228 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
 
this low intervention rate lends credence to the claim that a large number of 
frivolous and nonmeritorious suits are being filed by would-be 
whistleblowers.63  However, DOJ statistics regarding nonintervention 
cannot provide an accurate indicator of nonmeritorious claims for several 
reasons, including the nature of statistics compiled by the DOJ,64 limited 
prosecutorial resources,65 differing prosecutorial priorities,66 and the 
instance of cases with low potential monetary recoveries.67  Additionally, in 
cases where the DOJ has decided against intervention, it may reserve the 
right to intervene for good cause at a later point in the litigation.68  Indeed, 
the DOJ routinely investigates and remains involved in non-intervened 
cases where it still believes that the case has potential merit.69  The DOJ 
also monitors and remains active in the litigation of non-intervened cases 
where the development of FCA precedent or other interests of the 
government may be substantially affected.70 
While the government‘s intervention decision alone may not be an 
accurate indicator of meritorious claims, the high dismissal rate of these 
non-intervened cases appears to buttress the claims that opportunistic 
relators file a large number of frivolous or nonmeritorious suits.  The 
government declines to intervene in the majority of qui tam filings, and 94 
percent of these non-intervened cases where it did not intervene are later 
dismissed.71  While the dismissal rate of non-intervened suits should be 
 
 
 63. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 39, at 325–26; see also Broderick, supra note 
60, at 971.  Although beyond the scope of this Note, it is important to note that 
nonmeritorious claims may still provide net social benefits. See generally Alexander A. 
Reinert, Screening Out Innovation:  The Merits of Meritless Litigation, 89 IND. L.J. 1191, 
1225–30 (2014). 
 64. See JAMES B. HELMER, JR., FALSE CLAIMS ACT:  WHISTLEBLOWER LITIGATION 1079–
80 (6th ed. 2012). 
 65. See United States ex rel. Chandler v. Cook Cnty., 277 F.3d 969, 974 n.5 (7th Cir. 
2002) (―There is no reason to presume that a decision by the Justice Department not to 
assume control of the suit is a commentary on its merits.  The Justice Department may have 
myriad reasons for permitting the private suit to go forward including limited prosecutorial 
resources and confidence in the relator‘s attorney.‖). 
 66. See United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 
1994) (―The government argues it delayed intervening at the district court level because it 
sought to avoid the burdens of a litigant, such as discovery, and because of possible res 
judicata effects.‖). 
 67. See Qian, supra note 59, at 603.  Where a filed qui tam action involves a low 
potential monetary recovery but a high likelihood of successful prosecution, it is sensible for 
the DOJ to conserve government resources and allow relators to pursue the action without 
intervention. See Rich, supra note 62, at 1266–67. 
 68. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2012). 
 69. See Letter from Jim Esquea, Asst. Sec., U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., and 
Ronald Weich, Asst. Att‘y Gen., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, to Sen. Charles E. Grassley 13 (Jan. 
24, 2011), available at http://www.taf.org/DOJ-HHS-joint-letter-to-Grassley.pdf. 
 70. The DOJ may elect to file statements of interest on important matters during the 
litigation of these cases despite its decision not to intervene. See, e.g., United States ex rel. 
McMullen v. Ascension Health, No. 12 Civ. 00501, 2013 WL 6073549, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. 
Nov. 18, 2013); United States ex rel. Fox Rx, Inc. v. Omnicare, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 00962 
(WSD), 2012 WL 8020674, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2012). 
 71. See Rich, supra note 62, at 1236. 
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viewed in the context of the limited resources of the relators‘ bar72 and the 
sometimes onerous pleading requirements under Rule 9(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure,73 it is clear that a large number of qui tam suits 
are filed and later dismissed—supporting an inference that many of these 
lawsuits lack merit.  The filing of many nonmeritorious claims would 
certainly represent a strain on the resources of attorneys at the DOJ, who are 
required by statute to investigate qui tam complaints.74 
The FCA does contain provisions designed to limit frivolous claims—
i.e., the threat of dismissal of suits by the DOJ and fee-shifting 
provisions75—however, these provisions are often underutilized.  The DOJ 
has been reluctant to exercise its statutory power to dismiss relators‘ suits, 
even where these suits are based on a relator‘s incorrect liability 
determination.76  Additionally, the courts have invoked the fee-shifting 
provisions for frivolous suits only in rare cases.77  Moreover, relators faced 
with potential sanctions for bringing frivolous suits may generally withdraw 
claims under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without 
sanction.78  Accordingly, these provisions probably do not deter many 
relators from filing nonmeritorious complaints. 
2.   Profit Maximization and Overenforcement 
Similar to fears involving meritless cases, commentators argue that the 
qui tam private right of action leads to overenforcement of the FCA.79  
 
 
 72. DOJ intervention in a qui tam action brings to bear the considerable resources of the 
government in prosecuting a suit and extracting a settlement from a defendant firm.  A 
relator faced with the prospect of litigating a meritorious action without the support of the 
government may determine that the potential costs (including burdensome discovery) 
outweigh the benefits and abandon their suit. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 39, at 
325–26. 
 73. In several circuits, the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) limit many potentially 
meritorious lawsuits based on the lack of specificity regarding the presentment or payment 
of claims—evidence usually wholly within the possession of defendants or the government 
(and unobtainable by subpoena at the pleading stage of litigation). See generally Aaron 
Rubin, To Present Bills or Not to Present? An In-Depth Analysis of the Burden of Pleading 
in Qui Tam Suits, 8 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 467 (2012). 
 74. See Rich, supra note 62, at 1247. 
 75. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 76. See Rich, supra note 62, at 1264–65 (―[T]he government does not dismiss, and 
relators are permitted to proceed with, thousands of non-meritorious qui tam suits.‖). 
 77. Most courts decline to award fees to FCA defendants, noting that ―the award of fees 
under the false claims act is reserved for rare and special circumstances.‖ United States ex 
rel. Rafizadeh v. Cont‘l Common, Inc., 553 F.3d 869, 875 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Pfingston 
v. Ronan Eng‘g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 78. Todd B. Castleton, Compounding Fraud:  The Costs of Acquiring Relator 
Information Under the False Claims Act and the 1993 Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 327, 351 (1996). 
 79. See Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatization of 
Public Enforcement:  The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 
337 (2007) (―Overenforcement by zealous ‗private attorneys general‘ has been a concern for 
decades. The seminal literature on joint public-private enforcement abounds with 
examples.‖). 
230 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
 
Indeed, many argue that ―qui tam relators are . . . motivated primarily by 
prospects of monetary reward rather than the public good.‖80  As a result, 
this typical relator will be opportunistic, ―pursu[ing] actions aggressively, 
even where the actual harm caused by the defendant‘s conduct is low or the 
societal harm resulting from the prosecution would outweigh the potential 
recovery.‖81  According to this model, ―a relator will proceed with her suit 
only if the potential recovery, discounted by the chance of losing, 
outweighs the perceived costs.‖82  It is clear that increased whistleblower 
awards under the FCA have led to an ever-increasing number of qui tam 
actions.83 
However, the conception of relators as profit-motivated litigants 
disregards the complexity of whistleblower decision making, which may 
often be divorced from economic or monetary incentives.84  Whistleblowers 
who file qui tam actions come from varying backgrounds and are often 
driven by a complex set of motivations.  A relator often does not simply 
weigh the economic gains from filing suit against the potential economic 
losses—a number of motivations may be involved in the decision to engage 
in whistleblowing, including altruistic or ethical concerns, a desire to exact 
revenge on a former employer, or simply the desire to be heard.85  Indeed, 
many relators state that initially they did not intend to utilize the qui tam 
provisions when making their decision to blow the whistle, with many 
claiming that the financial reward offered under the FCA did not motivate 
their decision to become whistleblowers.86  Furthermore, internal 
 
 
 80. Joan H. Krause, ―Promises to Keep‖:  Health Care Providers and the Civil False 
Claims Act, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1414 (2002) (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United 
States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (1997)). 
 81. See Rich, supra note 62, at 1253; see also Beck, supra note 37, at 622 (―A qui tam 
informer . . . acts primarily for the sake of the statutory bounty.  The informer is a single-
minded automaton, programmed to seek out statutory violations and collect forfeitures.  The 
issues relevant to an informer‘s pursuit of forfeitures are:  (1) the likelihood that the informer 
could convince a court that the defendant violated a statute; and (2) the ability of the 
defendant to pay the resulting penalty. This focus on wealth maximization tends to exclude 
competing considerations.‖). 
 82. Rich, supra note 62, at 1266. 
 83. See Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $3.8 Billion 
from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2013 (Dec. 20, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/December/13-civ-1352.html (―The number of qui tam 
suits filed in fiscal year 2013 soared to 752—100 more than the record set the previous fiscal 
year.‖).  
 84. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform 
Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 
73, 110. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See, e.g., ETHICS RES. CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 34 (2014), 
available at http://www.ethics.org/downloads/2013NBESFinalWeb.pdf (―Of those who 
turned outside the company and/or to the federal government with concerns about 
misconduct, only 14 percent said they were motivated by possible bounty payments—the 
lowest number among ten choices in the survey.‖); Aaron S. Kesselheim, David M. Studdert 
& Michelle M. Mello, Whistle-Blowers’ Experiences in Fraud Litigation Against 
Pharmaceutical Companies, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1832, 1834 (2010).  Of course, these 
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whistleblowers (employees within a corporation) and external 
whistleblowers (nonemployee outsiders) each face a different calculus when 
blowing the whistle.87  As such, financial incentives targeted at limiting 
internal whistleblowers may lead to underenforcement and the reduction of 
meritorious claims by external whistleblowers.88  The wide variety of 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivating factors makes the fine-tuning of 
whistleblowing incentives a difficult task.89 
3.   The Relator‘s Share 
An important aspect of qui tam litigation involves the settlement or 
resolution of FCA actions and the determination of the relator‘s percentage 
of recovery, commonly referred to as the relator‘s share.90  The DOJ 
published internal guidelines in 1996, providing guidance to DOJ attorneys 
for determining a relator‘s percentage share of a given FCA settlement 
recovery.91  The DOJ‘s Relator‘s Share Guidelines have also been used by 
several courts in determining a relator‘s share in cases that result in trial 
verdicts and judgments or in cases where the government and relator cannot 
agree on an appropriate percentage share.92  The guidelines identify two 
sets of factors to consider in setting the percentage share, ―one set 
counseling in favor of a larger relator‘s share‖ where certain criteria are met 
and one set that would reduce the relator‘s share where relators do not meet 
expectations.93  While apparently useful in some respects, the guidelines 
have also been derided as containing inconsistencies and ―noticeably 
unhelpful.‖94  Because the various factors outlined in the guidelines lack 
 
 
relator accounts could be attributable, in part, to ―a socially desirable response bias.‖ Id. at 
1839. 
 87. See David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General:  Evidence 
From Qui Tam Litigation, 122 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1295 (2012). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See generally Naseem Faqihi, Note, Choosing Which Rule to Break First:  An In-
House Attorney Whistleblower’s Choices After Discovering a Possible Federal Securities 
Law Violation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3341, 3348–51 (2014). 
 90. See Joel D. Hesch, Breaking the Siege:  Restoring Equity and Statutory Intent to the 
Process of Determining Qui Tam Relator Awards Under the False Claims Act, 29 T.M. 
COOLEY L. REV. 217, 223 (2012). 
 91. See U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, RELATOR‘S SHARE GUIDELINES (1996), reprinted in 
JAMES B. HELMER, JR., FALSE CLAIMS ACT:  WHISTLEBLOWER LITIGATION app. 13.A., at 
1342–44 (6th ed. 2012) [hereinafter RELATOR‘S SHARE GUIDELINES]; see also United States 
ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Grp., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1333 (M.D. Fla. 2001) 
(―The DOJ maintains a set of internal ‗Relator‘s Share Guidelines,‘ which offer assistance to 
DOJ attorneys ‗[w]hen trying to reach agreement with a relator as to his share of the 
proceeds, or proposing an amount or percentage to a court  . . . .‘‖) (citation omitted). 
 92. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Shea v. Verizon Commc‘ns, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 78, 
83–84 (D.D.C. 2012); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 889 F. 
Supp. 2d 791, 796–97 (W.D. Va. 2012). 
 93. See Universal Health Servs., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d at 796. 
 94. United States ex rel. Johnson-Pochardt v. Rapid City Reg‘l Hosp., 252 F. Supp. 2d 
892, 900 (D.S.D. 2003) (citation omitted). 
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any ―indication of comparative weight,‖95 they fail to clearly delineate 
whistleblowers‘ expected performance. 
4.   Terms of Settlement 
Another important aspect of settling qui tam litigation is the specification 
of terms—i.e., the amount of damages, admissions of wrongdoing, 
confidentiality, and other provisions—that are incorporated into a final 
resolution.  Where the government intervenes in a qui tam action, it 
naturally takes the lead in negotiating a settlement.  The negotiations often 
center on the amount of calculated damages sustained by the government 
and the multiplier to be applied to the damages figure.96  While the 
government rarely settles for single damages, the 3.0 multiplier found in the 
statute is not mandatory,97 and the multiplier may often land somewhere 
between 1.0 and 3.0 in a final settlement, giving the government significant 
leeway in crafting settlements that take into account the defendant‘s 
cooperation and conduct during the FCA investigation.98 
Additionally, in the healthcare context, the government has routinely 
begun to utilize Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs) in conjunction with 
the settlement of underlying FCA claims, which impose defendant-specific 
compliance reforms and provide for continued monitoring of compliance 
efforts.99  Many healthcare providers agree to enter into these costly CIAs 
because of the threat of exclusion from the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs.100  The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) has also implemented a Provider 
Self-Disclosure Protocol that provides incentives to healthcare contractors 
to cooperate and self-report wrongdoing, including lower damages 
multipliers, releases from permissive exclusion from Medicare and 
Medicaid programs, and a presumption against the imposition of CIAs.101 
 
 
 95. See id. 
 96. See Janice M. Symchych et al., Settlement of Major Healthcare Fraud Enforcement 
Proceedings:  A Probing and Frank Analysis of the Competing Variables, 25 A.B.A. SEC. 
HEALTH LAW 1, 2, 8 (2013). 
 97. Any person who violates the FCA is liable for three times the amount of damages, 
but the government may, and often does, settle for less. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012). 
 98. James D. Wareham & Candice S. Shepherd, 9th Annual Corporate Counsel Institute 
at Georgetown University Law Center Continuing Legal Education:  Managing 
Whistleblower Claims Under the False Claims Act (Mar. 10, 2005), available at 2005 WL 
1611863, at *13 (―The company‘s cooperation with the government during the government‘s 
investigation is a key factor in the government‘s willingness to reduce the multiplier.‖). 
 99. See Symchych et al., supra note 96, at 11–12. 
 100. See Sharon Finegan, The False Claims Act and Corporate Criminal Liability:  Qui 
Tam Actions, Corporate Integrity Agreements and the Overlap of Criminal and Civil Law, 
111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 625, 651 (2007); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2012). 
 101. See U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
OIG‘s Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol 2 (April 17, 2013), available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/self-disclosure-info/files/Provider-Self-Disclosure-
Protocol.pdf.  Other federal agencies have employed similar voluntary disclosure programs 
in the past, and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Council has mandated disclosure 
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Separately, the DOJ has increasingly entered into deferred prosecution 
agreements (DPAs) and nonprosecution agreements (NPAs) with corporate 
defendants in the criminal context, which similarly require cooperating 
firms to implement rehabilitating measures and install corporate monitors in 
exchange for the avoidance of criminal liability.102  In contrast to CIAs, 
defendants entering into DPAs or NPAs are expected to accept admissions 
of conduct that are sufficient to establish criminal liability, as is required in 
a standard criminal plea agreement.103  These disclosure programs and 
standardized agreements seek to incentivize cooperation and deter future 
misconduct by federal contractors. 
II.   AGENCY COSTS 
Agency cost theory involves the examination of principal-agent 
relationships, the losses created from the divergence of the parties‘ interests, 
and the devices employed to reduce those losses.104  This section provides 
an overview of the basic principles of agency cost theory and its 
application.  Specifically, Part II.A provides a primer on the theory along 
with examples from the FCA context, and Part II.B provides a more in-
depth application of agency cost theory in the context of corporate crimes. 
A.   Theoretical Primer 
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling define an agency 
relationship as ―a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to 
the agent.‖105  Agency relationships arise wherever both parties expect to 
 
 
of FCA violations for government contractors involved in procurement contracts. See 
Timothy M. Cox, Is the Procurement Integrity Act ―Important‖ Enough for the Mandatory 
Disclosure Rule?  A Case for Inclusion, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 347, 371–77 (2011) (discussing 
FAR‘s mandatory disclosure rules and the Department of Defense‘s now defunct voluntary 
disclosure program). 
 102. See Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability:  Theory and Evidence, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 144, 152 (Keith N. Hylton & 
Alon Harel eds., 2011).  In two memoranda issued in 2008 and 2010, the DOJ provided 
guidance for the selection of monitors, and their mandates, in connection with DPAs and 
NPAs. See U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY‘S MANUAL, CRIMINAL RESOURCE 
MANUAL 166 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_ 
reading_room/usam/title9/crm00166.htm; U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY‘S 
MANUAL, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 163 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00163.htm. 
 103. See Arlen, supra note 102, at 152; see also Symchych et al., supra note 96, at 10 
(noting the customary presence of ―no admission‖ clauses in civil but not criminal 
settlements); U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
supra note 101, at 14 (―OIG does not demand an admission of liability in settlement 
agreements . . . .‖). 
 104. See Scott, supra note 19. 
 105. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
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derive a net benefit—usually when an efficient division of labor or 
specialization will result.106  Accordingly, in the FCA context, agency 
relationships exist between the government (principal) and relator-
whistleblowers (agents)107 and between the government (principal) and 
federal contractors (agents).  Government contractors that operate as 
corporate firms involve agency relationships between corporate 
shareholders that own the company (principals) and the corporate managers 
(agents) that run the company on their behalf.  In addition, as Jensen and 
Meckling note, ―there are agency costs generated at every level of the 
organization.‖108  A CEO supervises mid-level managers, who in turn 
supervise their low-level employees—different agency costs will arise at 
each of these levels and at every gradation in between.109  Thus, agency 
relationships also exist between managers (principals) and potential 
employee-whistleblowers (agents). 
The interests of an agent and the interests of its principal diverge in 
almost every type of agency relationship.110  For example, a federal 
contractor may cut corners on a government job to pocket more money for 
itself, or a relator may conduct a qui tam action for monetary gain despite 
its net negative social costs.  Agency costs involve the expenditures 
required to better align these agents‘ interests with the interests of their 
principals. 
Jensen and Meckling define agency costs as ―the sum of:  (1) the 
monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by 
the agent, [and] (3) the residual loss.‖111  The first category, monitoring 
costs, involves not only the oversight by principals of agents‘ activities but 
includes efforts by the principal ―to ‗control‘ the behavior of the agent 
through budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules, etc.‖112  
Monitoring costs may include financial audits, corporate compliance 
programs, and supervision of employees‘ activity.  In the FCA context, the 
government‘s decision to continue monitoring qui tam cases in which it 
elects not to intervene is representative of these monitoring costs.113  A 
corporate firm may also decide to erect internal compliance programs and 
controls to monitor employees‘ behavior and prevent FCA violations. 
 
 
 106. Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending 
by Banking Agents:  Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. 
U. L. REV. 515, 536 (2007). 
 107. At least one district court has explicitly adopted the conception of the relator-
government relationship as one grounded in agency law. See Jonathan H. Gold, Legal Duties 
That Qui Tam Relators and Their Counsel Owe to the Government, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
629, 641 (2007). 
 108. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 105, at 309 n.10. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 308. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 308 n.9. 
 113. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
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Bonding costs involve payments made by the principal to the agent ―to 
guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the 
principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take 
such actions.‖114  The classic example of bonding costs in the corporate 
context involves tying an agent‘s compensation to the principal‘s 
profitability through profit-sharing or stock options.115  In the FCA context, 
the DOJ‘s Relator‘s Share Guidelines strive to create similar bonding costs 
that serve to align the relator‘s interests with the government‘s interest in a 
successful resolution of FCA litigation.116  Additionally, corporate firms 
may require employees to sign agreements that obligate the disclosure of 
information regarding all known or suspected fraudulent activity to the 
corporation and the release of the corporation from all future claims brought 
by the employee based on such information.117  These types of agreements 
represent bonding costs borne by potential employee-whistleblowers. 
The last category of agency costs involves residual loss, a catchall for the 
losses incurred due to the limits of monitoring and bonding costs.  In an 
agency relationship, ―[r]ational principals will expend effort on monitoring 
and bonding until their marginal price of doing so is less than the expected 
benefit.‖118  Where monitoring and bonding stop paying off, residual loss 
steps in.  In the FCA context, a relator‘s decision to pursue or settle an FCA 
action on terms more favorable to the relator, rather than the government, 
represents residual loss in the relator-government relationship.119  Similarly, 
a corporation‘s decision to cover up wrongdoing, rather than self-report to 
the government, involves residual loss in the corporate-government 
relationship.  Yet, where the monitoring and bonding costs incurred no 
longer outweigh their benefits, these residual losses are not necessarily 
inefficient or suboptimal.120  They are simply an unavoidable result of the 
particular agency relationship.121 
 
 
 114. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 105, at 308. 
 115. See Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless 
Agents, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621, 1637 (2008). 
 116. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.  The Relator‘s Share Guidelines 
include increases in the percentage recovery for prosecution of the action in line with the 
government‘s interests and decreases in the percentage recovery for relator behavior that cuts 
against the government interest. Id. 
 117. In United States ex rel. Wildhirt v. AARS Forever, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 1215, 2013 WL 
5304092 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2013), the relators, employees of a healthcare provider, were 
required to sign confidentiality agreements and specific ―Confidential Acknowledgment of 
No Known Suspect Practices‖ statements in which relators certified that they were unaware 
of any suspect business practices (including FCA violations) or had otherwise reported any 
suspect practices to company management. Id. at *3.  The court conditionally allowed the 
defendant to bring counterclaims for breach of the ―No Known Suspect Practices‖ 
statements, provided that the defendant was not found liable for the alleged FCA violation. 
Id. at *7. 
 118. See Peterson, supra note 106, at 540. 
 119. See Rich, supra note 62, at 1254. 
 120. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 105, at 327–28. 
 121. Id. at 328. 
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Social norms, contractual obligations, and the legal system attempt ―to 
more closely align the incentives of agents and their principals.‖122  The 
legal system seeks to accomplish this task primarily through duty-based 
liabilities; most notably, fiduciary duties that apply to particular principal-
agent relationships.123  In addition, a bevy of rules and regulations (such as 
corporate governance and SEC reporting) have been put in place through 
the legal system to deter agents from straying from their principals‘ 
interests. 
The legal framework that governs agency relationships not only seeks to 
align the incentives of principals and agents, it also addresses the rights of 
third parties affected by the actions of agents acting on behalf of their 
principals.124  The judicially created construct of vicarious liability allows 
an individual harmed by a principal‘s agent to recover from the principal for 
the losses incurred.125  The vicarious liability standard recognizes that 
principals can use an agency relationship ―to capture an agent‘s 
comparative advantage in both socially beneficial and socially destructive 
behavior.‖126  Vicarious liability forces a principal (e.g., a corporation‘s 
shareholders) to internalize the socially destructive costs of an agent‘s 
actions, creating incentives to engage in monitoring and bonding to deter 
the agent from engaging in any socially destructive behavior.127  The 
construct of vicarious corporate liability—holding government contractors 
liable (and forcing them to pay sufficiently high fines) for frauds committed 
by their employees—creates an incentive for the implementation of 
monitoring and compliance programs to deter such crimes.128 
B.   Agency Costs and Corporate Fraud 
Jennifer Arlen and Reinier Kraakman have outlined a model for 
structuring the optimal scheme for corporate liability.129  Arlen notes that in 
large publicly traded corporations, imposing strict corporate liability alone 
will lead to suboptimal deterrence because the short-term interests of agents 
 
 
 122. See Peterson, supra note 106, at 537. 
 123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979) (―One standing in a fiduciary 
relation with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of 
duty imposed by the relation.‖). 
 124. See Peterson, supra note 106, at 540. 
 125. See Am. Soc‘y of Mech. Eng‘rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 566 (1982) 
(―[A] principal is liable for an agent‘s misrepresentations that cause pecuniary loss to a third 
party, when the agent acts within the scope of his apparent authority.‖ (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 249, 262 (1957))). 
 126. See Peterson, supra note 106, at 541. 
 127. See United States v. O‘Connell, 890 F.2d 563, 567–69 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that 
under the FCA, corporations may be ―held vicariously liable in order to deter violations and 
to protect the public‖). 
 128. Jennifer Arlen, Public Versus Private Enforcement of Securities Fraud 20 (2007) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://weblaw.usc.edu/assets/docs/Arlen.pdf. 
 129. Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct:  An 
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997). 
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often diverge significantly from those of the corporation‘s shareholders.130  
Arlen and Kraakman advocate the employment of a composite liability 
regime to optimally deter crime—strict vicarious liability coupled with 
duty-based measures to increase the probability that such crimes will be 
detected.131  Such a composite liability regime induces firms to adopt 
―policing measures‖ aimed at detecting and self-reporting wrongdoing.132  
It also induces firms to adopt ―preventive measures‖ that reduce the benefit 
or increase the direct costs of corporate crime.133 
A composite corporate liability regime combines strict liability for 
violations—corporations are forced to pay for the misconduct of their 
agents—with increased liability where firms fail to adopt effective policing 
and prevention measures.134  Firms that do not meet their ―duty-based‖ 
obligations of monitoring, self-reporting detected wrongs, and full 
cooperation, will face increased penalties for their failures beyond the 
default penalty imposed under the strict liability framework.135  Under this 
composite framework, the penalty imposed on firms which do not meet 
their policing or prevention duties must be greater than the expected 
sanction when firms do police optimally but still commit misconduct, 
taking into account that a failure to police will decrease the probability of 
detection and sanction.136  In other words, corporations must expect to face 
a large enough penalty for failure to comply such that it makes economic 
sense to implement internal compliance and cooperation procedures, even 
though both compliance and cooperation will increase the chance of being 
held liable for a violation.  Additionally, the duty-based policing and 
prevention measures must be sufficiently detailed so that firms have clear 
guidance on the nature of their required monitoring and policing duties and 
the nature of the enhanced sanctions imposed where firms fail to meet these 
duties.137 
Arlen and Kraakman‘s composite liability framework has been 
successfully implemented in the criminal context, where the DOJ has 
employed a mix of strict corporate liability with duty-based sanctions for 
firms that do not monitor, self-report, and cooperate with authorities.138  In 
1999, the DOJ adopted a formal policy governing corporate criminal 
liability where firms can avoid or mitigate penalties by following a clear 
 
 
 130. See Arlen, supra note 102, at 144. 
 131. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 129, at 699, 726. 
 132. Id. at 699. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. at 726. 
 135. Id. at 727; see also Arlen, supra note 102, at 185 (describing a ―multi-tiered 
composite duty-based liability that clearly specifies that the firm is subject to three duties (ex 
ante monitoring, self-reporting of detected wrongs, and full cooperation), and provides clear 
guidance on the nature of these three duties and the sanctions for violating each‖). 
 136. See Arlen, supra note 102, at 180–81. 
 137. See id. at 191. 
 138. Id. at 151–52. 
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framework for cooperation.139  The DOJ‘s policy has been clearly outlined 
in a succession of memoranda and guidance in DOJ manuals that detail how 
corporations can receive ―cooperation credit‖ or ―mitigating credit‖ in the 
criminal context for cooperating with authorities and self-reporting 
wrongdoing.140 
III.   AGENCY COST ANALYSIS OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
As discussed above, the FCA framework is replete with examples of 
agency relationships and their attendant costs.141  Analyzing the FCA qui 
tam provisions utilizing an agency cost approach allows one to determine 
the advantages and disadvantages of the FCA statutory framework.  
Part III.A presents an agency cost analysis of the advantages of the qui tam 
provisions of the FCA, exploring the increased prosecution and detection 
and the self-monitoring encouraged by qui tam actions.  Part III.B analyzes 
the agency costs involved in the potential disadvantages of the qui tam 
provisions, including the disincentives to investing in policing and 
preventions measures, barriers to full cooperation with the government, and 
the incentivizing of frivolous qui tam suits. 
A.   Advantages 
It is clear from recent record-setting FCA recoveries that the qui tam 
framework provides distinct advantages in enhancing FCA enforcement.142  
As the FCA‘s chief proponent Senator Charles Grassley has noted, ―[t]he 
fact is that no other law in existence has been more effective in battling 
fraud than the False Claims Act has in the past 25 years.‖143  The reasons 
for the FCA‘s success stem from the qui tam structural incentives, which 
have spurred greater enforcement by the DOJ, increased detection of fraud 
 
 
 139. See Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 66 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 321, 358–59 (2012) (―Recognizing the need to provide firms with stronger 
incentives to detect crimes, report them, and fully cooperate, in 1999 then-Deputy Attorney 
General Eric Holder effectively adopted an alternative regime to govern the sanctioning of 
firms that adopted an effective compliance program, self-reported, or fully cooperated with 
federal authorities.‖). 
 140. The original guidelines issued in 1999 were referred to as the ―Holder memo‖ in 
reference to then-deputy Attorney General Eric Holder who authored the memorandum. See 
Arlen, supra note 102, at 151.  The Holder memo has been updated since 1999 and has been 
included in official DOJ guidance. See U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY‘S MANUAL 
§ 9–28.000 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/ 
usam/title9/28mcrm.htm. 
 141. See supra notes 107–09, 113, 116, 119 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 143. Oversight of the False Claims Act:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution and Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014) 
(statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley) (―Before the 1986 amendments, [the FCA] brought 
in a tiny fraction of what it does today, only about $40 million a year. At that rate, it would 
have recovered only $1 billion in the past 25 years. Thanks to the 1986 amendments, it‘s 
brought back 42 times that much. Clearly, the False Claims Act is working, and it‘s working 
fantastically.‖). 
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by employee-relators, and provided a unique deterrent threat to corporate 
fraud. 
1.   Increased Fraud Prosecution and Detection 
The FCA‘s qui tam system functions as a monitoring system for 
taxpayers to ensure that public enforcers increase prosecution and detection 
of fraud.144  In this agency model, the taxpayers represent the principals, 
and the public enforcers, the DOJ‘s attorneys, represent the agents.  Just as 
in any principal-agent relationship, prosecutors‘ incentives often do not 
align with those of the taxpayers, especially because public enforcers are 
not motivated by monetary gain and thus often do not have an economic 
incentive to maximize fraud recoveries.145  As a result, the DOJ may well 
underenforce when it comes to fraud perpetrated against the government.  
The qui tam provisions force government attorneys to devote more time and 
resources to aggressively attacking fraud against taxpayers,146 thereby 
aligning the DOJ‘s practices with the stated goals of legislators who 
continue to encourage a more aggressive stance toward rooting out fraud.147  
Qui tam relators and their counsel have been responsible for pushing novel 
theories of liability that prosecutors were initially loathe to pursue—most 
notably, FCA claims based on off-label marketing of pharmaceuticals, 
which have brought in billions of dollars in fraud recoveries.148  Indeed, qui 
tam relators‘ actions largely spurred the DOJ‘s current aggressive 
 
 
 144. See Kovacic, supra note 20, at 1822–24. 
 145. See Howse & Daniels, supra note 20, at 543–44 (―From an agency theory 
perspective, even where the government itself is acting in the public interest, delegated 
decision-makers within government, such as prosecuting attorneys or investigators, may 
have interests that are not fully aligned with those of government.‖); see also William B. 
Rubenstein, On What a ―Private Attorney General‖ Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 2129, 2139 (2004). 
 146. See Kovacic, supra note 20, at 1806 (―The 1986 reforms sought to cure [the 
problem] . . . that government law enforcement bodies fail to attack fraud as aggressively as 
taxpayers would prefer.‖). 
 147. See, e.g., Combating War Profiteering:  Are We Doing Enough to Investigate and 
Prosecute Contracting Fraud and Abuse in Iraq?:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary) (―During the nearly 4 years of war, the Department of Justice has failed to 
move aggressively enough in prosecuting fraud in Iraq.‖). 
 148. The first off-label FCA case was pursued by a relator in a non-intervened qui tam 
action. See United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D. Mass. 
2001).  Since 2001, off-label FCA cases brought by relators have resulted in massive 
recoveries for the federal government. See, e.g., Duff Wilson, Novartis Settles Off-Label 
Marketing Case Over 6 Drugs for $422.5 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2010, at B5; Press 
Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Allergan Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $600 Million to 
Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Botox® (Sept. 1, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-civ-988.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t 
of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company Agrees to Pay $1.415 Billion to Resolve Allegations of 
Off-Label Promotion of Zyprexa (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
pr/2009/January/09-civ-038.html. 
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prosecution of off-label FCA cases.149  In this regard, the qui tam 
provisions have pushed the DOJ away from avoiding excessive risk 
aversion and toward what may be a more socially desirable level of 
enforcement and deterrence.150  The qui tam provisions have been 
indisputably successful in checking perceived prosecutorial reticence and 
reducing monitoring costs in the taxpayer-prosecutor relationship, which 
was a major impetus for the legislative overhaul of the FCA in 1986.151 
The qui tam provisions also provide an effective method for acquiring 
―high-level, detailed, inside information‖ concerning corporate frauds.152  
Corporate fraud is notoriously hard to uncover, and detection absent inside 
information requires a considerable amount of investigative resources.153  
As a result, a large portion of fraud often goes undetected.154  As supporters 
of the FCA have noted, qui tam relators serve an important role in bringing 
this fraud to light because violators will otherwise cover up wrongdoing, 
destroy or alter evidence, and generally not cooperate with 
investigations.155  The unique nature of fraud and the concomitant need for 
increased incentives for detection has also led to the institution of 
whistleblower incentives in other contexts such as tax fraud156 and 
 
 
 149. Subsequent to Parke-Davis, the DOJ has aggressively pursued off-label FCA cases. 
See Rich, supra note 62, at 1270–73.  Professor Rich argues that the Parke-Davis experience 
represents an undue usurping of the DOJ‘s prosecutorial discretion. See id. at 1273–74.  
However, the fact that the DOJ has pursued such off-label cases with increasing vigor seems 
to support the conclusion that the DOJ actually underenforced in the off-label marketing 
space prior to Parke-Davis and its progeny. 
 150. See Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence:  
A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2195–96 (2010); see also Howse & Daniels, 
supra note 20, at 543 (―The possibility of the government failing to prosecute 
wrongdoing . . . reinforces the value of a private right of action as a means of ‗guarding the 
guardians.‘‖). 
 151. See Engstrom, supra note 87, at 1273 n.100. 
 152. Pamela H. Bucy, Game Theory and the Civil False Claims Act:  Iterated Games and 
Close-Knit Groups, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1021, 1026 (2004). 
 153. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 835 (1994) (―Many corporate crimes—such as securities fraud, 
government procurement fraud, and some environmental crimes—cannot be readily detected 
by the government.‖); see also Brian K. Payne & Bruce L. Berg, Looking For Fraud in All 
the Wrong Places, 70 POLICE J. 220, 222 (1997) (discussing the difficulty of detecting fraud 
in government healthcare programs). 
 154. Best estimates are that approximately 14.5 percent of large public corporations 
engage in fraud, and only 27.5 percent of fraud is caught. See I.J. Alexander Dyck, Adair 
Morse & Luigi Zingales, How Pervasive Is Corporate Fraud?  tbl.2 (Rotman School of 
Management, Working Paper No. 2222608, 2013), available at http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.2139/ssrn.2222608. 
 155. See False Claims Correction Act of 2007:  Joint Hearing on H.R. 4854 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property and the Subcomm. on 
Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 47 (2008) 
(statement of Shelley R. Slade, Partner, Vogel, Slade & Goldstein, LLP) (―Without the help 
of insiders who brought the Government documents and other hard evidence of the fraud, it 
would have been extremely difficult for the Government to develop sufficient evidence to 
establish liability in many of the successful FCA cases.‖). 
 156. See I.R.C. § 7623 (2012). 
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securities fraud.157  Indeed, whistleblowing may be ―the single most 
effective method of detecting corporate and financial fraud.‖158 
2.   ―Self‖-Monitoring 
The qui tam structure also effectively enlists lower-level agents to engage 
in monitoring of higher-up corporate managers.  The current FCA 
framework encourages lower-level employees to monitor shareholders‘ 
agents (corporate managers) without the need for shareholders to engage in 
traditional top-down monitoring procedures.  If corporate managers know 
that their own employees are on the lookout for fraudulent activity, they 
will be less inclined to participate in the commission of these frauds or 
recklessly allow them to occur.159  Indeed, corporate managers that conspire 
to commit or cause FCA violations may be held personally liable for those 
violations.160  These incentives also inure to shareholders‘ benefit because 
managers faced with the threat of personal FCA liability will be deterred 
from engaging in otherwise profitable violative conduct.  The ex ante 
knowledge of the probability of monitoring by potential qui tam relators 
plays an integral role in deterring corporate agents from engaging in 
fraud.161 
B.   Potential Disadvantages 
Several commentators have noted that the whistleblower incentives 
created by the FCA are potentially harmful to the internal organization of 
corporations.162  Unlike in the context of criminal corporate liability, where 
the prevailing enforcement framework incentivizes robust internal 
compliance and monitoring procedures and cooperation with criminal 
investigations,163 the FCA whistleblower framework creates incentives to 
disfavor internal compliance reporting and cooperation with civil 
 
 
 157. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6 (2012). 
 158. See Legislative Proposals to Address the Negative Consequences of the Dodd-Frank 
Whistleblower Provisions:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t 
Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 10 (2011) (statement of 
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Professor of Law, Univ. of Toledo College of Law). 
 159. In extreme cases, this type of ―self‖-monitoring can interfere with legitimate 
management choices. See Kovacic, supra note 20, at 1826–27.  Where management 
decisions tread close to the line of permissibility, monitoring by lower-level agents can 
effectively inhibit lawful, and economically efficient, management decisions. Id. at 1827. 
 160. See Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces $1.7 
Million Settlement with Testquest, $2.3 Million Judgment Against Former Testquest 
Manager, and Filing of Criminal and Civil Charges Against Public School Teacher in 
Connection with Scheme to Defraud Federal Government into Paying for Tutoring Services 
That Were Never Provided (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/ 
August13/TestquestSettlement.php. 
 161. See Dyck et al., supra note 154, at 18. 
 162. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 39, at 334–35 (noting the conflict of interest 
employees face between reporting internally and blowing the whistle externally). 
 163. See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text. 
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investigations, thereby actively impeding the ―duty-based‖ corporate 
liability framework posited by Arlen and Kraakman as providing socially 
optimal deterrence.  Under the current FCA framework, these incentives 
exacerbate the ―inevitable divergence of self interest between principal and 
agent.‖164 
1.   Bypassing Internal Compliance Procedures 
Potential relators benefit from bypassing corporate compliance 
procedures and bringing allegations and evidence of fraud directly to the 
government.  For example, because of the public disclosure bar165 and first-
to-file provision,166 an employee that reports malfeasance up the chain to 
her superiors may find that any recovery under the FCA will be foreclosed.  
If managers disclose the allegations to the government or another employee 
files a qui tam suit first before the aspiring whistleblower files her own 
complaint in district court, the qui tam action may be precluded.167  Thus, in 
theory, employees on their ―race to the courthouse‖ are incentivized to 
bypass internal reporting procedures that would otherwise alert 
management to fraud.168  This apparent incentive to bypass internal 
compliance procedures might be expected to eliminate the gains achieved 
from socially optimal corporate liability regimes. 
However, the bypassing of internal compliance procedures by relators is 
not observed with any regularity.  Indeed, evidence suggests that the vast 
majority of employee-relators report wrongdoing internally before filing a 
qui tam action.169  As noted above, this may be attributable to the fact that 
whistleblowers are often motivated by personal or altruistic concerns rather 
than purely economic incentives.170  Potential whistleblowers are 
incentivized to first report up before reporting out, because of self-
 
 
 164. See Scott, supra note 19. 
 165. 31 U.S.C § 3730(e)(4)(a) (2012). 
 166. Id. § 3730(b)(5). 
 167. See United States ex rel. Grant v. Rush-Presbyterian/St. Luke‘s Med. Ctr., No. 99 
Civ. 06313, 2001 WL 40807, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2001) (public disclosure bar applied to 
lawsuit filed by employee after hospital affirmatively provided information to government 
authorities of fraudulent billing practices). 
 168. See Kovacic, supra note 20, at 1831 (―[E]mployees may choose to file qui tam suits 
instead of resorting to internal anti-fraud mechanisms such as hotlines.‖); see also U.S. 
CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, FIXING THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT:  THE CASE FOR 
COMPLIANCE-FOCUSED REFORMS 18–19 (2013), available at 
http://instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Fixing_The_FCA_Pages_Web.pdf. 
 169. ETHICS RES. CTR., INSIDE THE MIND OF A WHISTLEBLOWER:  A SUPPLEMENTAL 
REPORT OF THE 2011 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 13 (2012), available at 
http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/reportingFinal_0.pdf (―Only three percent of [whistleblower] 
reports were made externally at first, but of the secondary reports almost four times as many 
were made to someone outside . . . .‖); NAT‘L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR., IMPACT OF QUI TAM 
LAWS ON INTERNAL CORPORATE COMPLIANCE:  A REPORT TO THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION 4 (2010), available at http://www.whistleblowers.org/storage/whistleblowers/ 
documents/DoddFrank/nwcreporttosecfinal.pdf. 
 170. See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text. 
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preservation, potential effects on savings and pensions, personal reputation, 
and ―the undiversified human capital investment‖ in the employee‘s 
corporation.171  In addition, the original source exception allows a relator to 
still recover even if they first report internally,172 and the 2009 amendments 
to the FCA also provide an incentive to report up the internal compliance 
chain by covering internal reporting as protected activity under the FCA‘s 
antiretaliation provisions.173 
The real threat to internal compliance programs, especially in the civil 
FCA context, involves the cost-benefit analysis that corporate firms must 
employ when deciding to implement and enforce effective internal 
compliance programs.  Even in instances where corporations employ 
internal compliance programs, these programs may function as mere 
―window dressing,‖ divorced from the actual day-to-day business of the 
organization and meant only to provide the appearance of legitimacy.174  
Indeed, corporate managers may well encourage internal reporting to 
ineffective compliance programs to prevent the external reporting of 
violations, especially in instances where corporations face inadequate 
penalties for otherwise profitable violations.175  It is unsurprising that 
corporate firms, absent a statutory requirement, will not adopt effective 
internal compliance procedures because the costs of these provisions often 
outweigh the benefits.176 
Additionally, when corporate management learns of misconduct or 
failures that may trigger a violation of the FCA, they are disincentivized 
from sharing information regarding the problem with the widest number of 
employees in search of a solution, for fear that they may provide an 
employee with the basis for an FCA suit.177  Firms that employ internal 
investigations of possible FCA violations in contemplation of voluntary 
disclosure to the government may find that employees involved become qui 
tam relators, reporting externally before the problem can be dealt with 
internally, thereby short-circuiting any benefits of conducting a robust 
internal investigation.178  Thus, the internal investigation of possible 
wrongdoing can create undue agency costs for the corporate firm—limiting 
information sharing and hampering firm-wide problem solving. 
 
 
 171. See Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud:  A Theoretical Analysis of 
Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1909–10 (2007) (discussing 
whistleblower motivations by analyzing the case of Enron whistleblower Sherrod Watkins). 
 172. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2012). 
 173. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 174. Justin Blount & Spencer Markel, The End of the Internal Compliance World As We 
Know It, or an Enhancement of the Effectiveness of Securities Law Enforcement?  Bounty 
Hunting Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s Whistleblower Provisions, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 1023, 1043–47 (2012). 
 175. See id. at 1050. 
 176. See Macey, supra note 171, at 1937–38. 
 177. See Kovacic, supra note 20, at 1833. 
 178. See Stephen Robert Geisler, Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Violations of 
Federal Law, 51 ALA. L. REV. 375, 384–86 (1999). 
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2.   Disincentives to Cooperate and Self-Report 
The current FCA statutory scheme, and its implementation by the DOJ, 
also discourages corporations from self-reporting and fully cooperating 
with government investigations.  The current FCA statute does contemplate 
reduced damages—from treble to double—if corporations self-report fraud 
within thirty days of learning of a possible violation;179 however, very few 
firms are able to meet the strict self-reporting requirements of the statute.180  
Indeed, most firms choose not to self-report the violations they uncover 
through internal compliance programs, deciding rather to cover up 
wrongdoing or suppress whistleblower activity.181  Even in instances where 
corporations do timely self-report, the public disclosure bar may not be 
triggered, and a corporation may still face significant FCA liability.182  
 
 
 179. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2012). 
 180. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 785 
n.16 (2000) (―[T]reble damages may be reduced to double damages in certain cases . . . . 
This exception, however, applies only in some of those (presumably few) cases involving 
defendants who provide information concerning the violation before they have knowledge 
that an investigation is underway.‖) (citations omitted); see also John C. Ruhnka, Edward J. 
Gac & Heidi Boerstler, Qui Tam Claims:  Threat to Voluntary Compliance Programs in 
Health Care Organizations, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL‘Y & L. 283, 299 (2000) (discussing the 
―very serious flaws with [the] FCA incentive for voluntary disclosure‖). 
 181. See Michael M. Mustokoff, Robin Locke Nagele & Jonathan Swichar, To Disclose 
or Not to Disclose: There Should Be No Question, 13 A.B.A. SEC. HEALTH LAW 28, 32 
(2001) (―[T]he best advice for the least visible offenders must continue to be ‗when in 
doubt—wait it out.‘‖).  The experience of FCA whistleblower Stephen Huey is exemplary of 
the prevailing corporate attitude toward self-disclosure.  In July 2009, Mr. Huey, then chief 
financial officer and vice president of finance of Summit Healthcare Association 
(―Summit‖), a Medicare provider, brought the company‘s improper billing of Medicare to 
the attention of its board of directors. See United States v. Summit Healthcare Ass‘n, No. 10 
Civ. 08003 (PCT) (FJM), 2011 WL 814898, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2011).  At a board 
meeting, Huey explained that audits had revealed Summit was admitting patients who did 
not meet Medicare criteria and nevertheless submitting claims for reimbursement for those 
patients, in contravention of Medicare guidelines. Id. at *2–3.  Huey recommended that 
Summit ―quantify its exposure, self-report, and return any overpayments to the government.‖ 
Id. at *2.  However, Summit‘s chief executive officer counseled Summit‘s board that the 
company need not self-report ―but instead wait to see if Medicare ‗caught‘ the issues.‖ Id.  
During a subsequent board meeting in September 2009, Huey again tried to explain 
Summit‘s liability under the FCA for retaining the Medicare overpayments but was rebuffed 
by Summit‘s CEO. Id.  Huey subsequently made written reports of the compliance violations 
using Summit‘s internal reporting procedures in October and November of 2009, but he was 
later fired, allegedly in retaliation for his internal reporting. Id. at *3–4.  After his 
termination, Huey filed a qui tam action in federal court, including allegations of FCA 
violations that he had originally brought to the board‘s attention and a claim for retaliation. 
Id. at *3. 
 182. For example, in July 2004, a quality control employee at defense contractor General 
Dynamics reported an alleged FCA violation to the contractor‘s corporate management. See 
United States ex rel. Lockhart v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1336 (N.D. 
Fla. 2007).  The employee informed management that he had been instructed by his 
immediate supervisors to forego certain mandatory testing on gunpowder used in 
ammunition sold to the government. Id.  The corporate management of General Dynamics 
subsequently made an affirmative disclosure of the alleged FCA violation through the 
Department of Defense‘s Voluntary Disclosure Program. Id.  Three days after the voluntary 
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Where firms employ effective internal compliance programs and self-report 
to the government, they increase the probability that corporate crimes will 
be detected and that the government will impose liability.183  If the liability 
enhancement effect of having a successful compliance program exceeds the 
deterrent penalty, then a firm will likely not undertake adequate policing 
measures, because such measures will only serve to increase expected 
liability.184  Thus, the current FCA framework overpenalizes firms that 
employ effective compliance programs and fully cooperate with the 
government relative to those firms that do not. 
3.   Overenforcement and Meritless Lawsuits 
As noted above, it is not possible to accurately determine the relative 
percentage of parasitic and inaccurate lawsuits being filed in the FCA 
context, but the high dismissal rate associated with non-intervened qui tam 
cases supports the view that this is a potential problem.185  The large 
monetary incentives provided by the FCA‘s qui tam provisions create the 
possibility for fabrication of claims for profit.186  Moreover, fears of 
fabricated and frivolous claims are reasonable where private enforcement 
supplements public enforcement.  Absent private enforcement, an 
―idealized public enforcer‖ would presumably be sensitive to the 
overdeterrence ramifications of prosecuting cases where liability is 
questionable.187  Conversely, where the qui tam award is high enough to 
make litigation profitable, ―the predictable result would be an increase in 
over-deterrence costs relative to a world with only public enforcement.‖188  
This indifference to the social costs of qui tam lawsuits may encourage a 
profit-motivated relator‘s counsel to bring frivolous claims, ―using the 
threat of massive discovery costs or bad publicity to extract settlements 
when the social cost of adjudication would exceed any possible benefit or, 
worse, where culpability is entirely absent.‖189  Indeed, relators‘ firms have 
been sanctioned for using aggressive tactics to seek out disgruntled 
employees and bringing frivolous suits in search of a nuisance value 
settlement.190  The confidential settlement of nuisance value suits is often a 
 
 
disclosure, the employee filed an FCA complaint on the basis of the alleged testing violation; 
on a motion to dismiss, the district court held that the voluntary disclosure to the Department 
of Defense program did not trigger the public disclosure bar absent any government follow-
up. Id. at 1337–40. 
 183. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 129, at 708. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
 186. See Howse & Daniels, supra note 20, at 540 (―[I]t is often claimed that the prospect 
of large awards to whistleblowers provides an incentive for employees to fabricate claims of 
wrongdoing for personal profit.‖). 
 187. See Rose, supra note 150, at 2201. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Engstrom, supra note 87, at 1254. 
 190. One district court decision, later overturned on appeal, accused relator‘s counsel of 
contacting ex-employees in hopes of ―manufacturing an FCA lawsuit.‖ United States v. ITT 
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rational choice for defendants faced with steep litigation costs, reputational 
harm, and the prospect of follow-on civil litigation.191  The costs of settling 
a large number of nuisance value lawsuits would clearly pose a distinct 
disadvantage of the qui tam private right of action. 
However, empirical data detailing a high incidence of frivolous nuisance 
value litigation is conspicuously lacking, especially in the FCA context.192  
Moreover, a certain level of frivolous suits may be inevitable, and more 
than justified, where qui tam cases expose massive frauds.193  At bottom, it 
is not clear how such frivolous litigation might be curtailed without limiting 
other meritorious suits.194  The generous whistleblower incentives that 
critics bemoan are the same incentives that encourage relators‘ law firms to 
handle complex and expensive cases,195 and a specialized relators‘ bar may 
provide an important screening mechanism in determining which FCA suits 
have substantial merit.196  Focusing on the profit-maximizing motivations 
of the relators‘ bar and altering the calculus involved in settling frivolous 
claims is likely the most fertile grounds for allaying concerns regarding 
overenforcement and limiting the filing of meritless lawsuits. 
IV.   PROPOSED REFORMS 
The foregoing analysis of the FCA‘s statutory scheme highlights the 
issues that arise in the context of the multienforcer framework of the FCA, 
most notably the undue agency costs engendered by qui tam provisions that 
may lead to overdeterrence costs.  Having identified particular problems, 
the next step involves determining how to optimally change the design of 
the FCA‘s multienforcer approach.  One way to approach the issue is by 
legislative action—i.e., ―adopting a narrower fraud prohibition, lower 
 
 
Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 07 Civ. 00867 (TWP) (MJD), 2012 WL 1028794, at *4 (S.D. Ind. 
Mar. 26, 2012), rev’d sub nom. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 719 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 
2013).  The court noted that, ―[h]aving determined that this lawsuit is frivolous, the Court 
easily finds that it was brought for an improper purpose—presumably, to extract a large 
settlement from ITT, which would otherwise be forced to incur massive legal fees.‖ Id. at 
*12. 
 191. See Todd J. Canni, Who’s Making False Claims, the Qui Tam Plaintiff or the 
Government Contractor?  A Proposal to Amend the FCA to Require that All Qui Tam 
Plaintiffs Possess Direct Knowledge, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2007); see also William 
E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act As a Deterrent to Participation in Government 
Procurement Markets, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201, 225 (1998) (―As a rough rule of thumb, 
the survey data suggest that contractors incur out-of-pocket legal costs of at least $250,000 
to $500,000 whenever the firm is informed that the government has commenced an inquiry 
into alleged [FCA] violations or a qui tam relator has filed a suit.‖). 
 192. See Lance P. McMillan, The Nuisance Settlement ―Problem‖:  The Elusive Truth 
and a Clarifying Proposal, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 221, 227 (2007); see also Engstrom, 
supra note 87, at 1269. 
 193. See Rapp, supra note 29, at 133. 
 194. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.  Legislators face difficult calibration 
challenges when seeking ―to harness heterogeneous private enforcers.‖ Engstrom, supra note 
87, at 1295. 
 195. See Rapp, supra note 29, at 131. 
 196. See Engstrom, supra note 87, at 1257–59. 
2014] AGENCY COSTS AND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 247 
 
sanctions, or more defendant-friendly procedural rules.‖197  Indeed, many 
commentators have advocated for these types of legislative fixes to the FCA 
framework, including instituting a direct knowledge requirement,198 
applying fee-shifting provisions to relator‘s counsel,199 and raising the 
standard of proof for FCA liability.200  However, such an approach is 
undercut by the lack of data on the social costs of both fraud and 
overdeterrence, which are ―exceedingly difficult to observe and 
measure.‖201  Moreover, empirical data regarding the economic incentives 
and social costs of private enforcement under the FCA is severely 
lacking,202 making changes to the FCA‘s ―substance, sanctions, and 
procedure‖ an approach fraught with uncertainty of whether such proposed 
reforms will do more harm than good.203  For example, raising the standard 
of proof in the FCA context would no doubt ―reduce the likelihood that 
meritless or weak qui tam cases would be filed under the FCA,‖204 but it 
would also reduce the filing of a large swath of meritorious qui tam cases 
where clear and convincing proof is not readily obtainable. 
These observations lead to several useful changes to qui tam enforcement 
incentives that can be implemented through targeted policy changes, rather 
than through blunt legislative fixes that risk sacrificing prosecutorial 
flexibility.  This part sets forth these proposals, which rely on the DOJ‘s 
discretion to create a standardized FCA settlement and cooperation 
framework, establishing clear incentives for potential whistleblowers and 
corporate defendants alike that will serve to better align the interests of 
these agents in their respective relationships with the government. 
A.   Relator’s Share Guidelines 
The DOJ‘s Relator‘s Share Guidelines already provide a rudimentary 
framework for incentivizing qui tam relators that does not require a 
legislative overhaul of the FCA.205  To the extent that a number of potential 
whistleblowers are incentivized to file qui tam actions rather than report 
conduct internally through compliance programs, certain tweaks to 
whistleblowing incentives can go a long way.  Rather than advocate for a 
change to the statutory framework, incentives can be built into a formal 
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DOJ settlement procedure to incentivize the few relators that would rather 
report out than report up. 
The twenty-five separate criteria included in the DOJ‘s Relator‘s Share 
Guidelines206 should be replaced with three definite benchmarks that will 
signal to relators the percentage recoveries they can expect from any 
settlement or judgment.  Rather than simply listing criteria that would point 
toward an increased or decreased percentage,207 these benchmarks should 
require relators to meet definite criteria to receive a corresponding 
percentage recovery.  First, internal employee-relators who file a qui tam 
action without reporting up contemporaneously or prior to filing, in the 
absence of good cause, would be limited to a 15 percent share of any 
resulting settlement amount.  An increase to a 20 percent share would be 
warranted for relators and relators‘ counsel who provide substantial 
assistance in investigating and litigating the action.  Finally, a 25 percent 
share would be reserved for those relators who truly go above and beyond 
by offering extraordinary assistance in pursuing the qui tam claim. 
These benchmarks would be particularly effective in incentivizing the 
class of relators who are most likely to report out rather than report up—
those relators who are swayed most by the monetary incentives of the qui 
tam award.  Additionally, faced with a lower percentage recovery, a 
relator‘s counsel would presumably advise her client to report internally 
and file a qui tam complaint simultaneously in order to maximize the 
percentage recovery.  Instituting clearly defined benchmarks for relator 
share percentages will help to better align the interests of relators and the 
government. 
B.   Corporate Cooperation 
Although the FCA statute already rewards cooperating entities with a 
reduction from treble to double damages, as noted above, the standard for 
meeting the statutory criteria can be impossibly high.208  As a result, many 
firms choose to ―wait it out‖ rather than cooperate with the DOJ‘s 
investigations into FCA actions.209  The DOJ already employs a model 
framework for encouraging corporate cooperation in the criminal context 
that has consistently produced positive results.210  These lessons learned in 
the criminal context should be applied in the FCA context as well. 
The DOJ can invoke its prosecutorial discretion to outline concrete duty-
based incentives for corporate cooperation, policing, and prevention.211  
These criteria should include damages reductions where defendant firms 
employ functional compliance programs, timely self-report, and fully 
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cooperate with the DOJ‘s investigative efforts.  In order to be effective, 
cooperating corporations should be offered full amnesty from exclusion or 
debarment from government programs where they meet the delineated 
criteria and fully reimburse the government.212  Additionally, the criteria 
must be clear and concrete enough for FCA defendants and prosecutors to 
provide a standardized framework, much like the framework created by the 
analogous criminal corporate liability guidelines.213 
Where corporations do not employ adequate policing and prevention 
measures and do not fully cooperate with the government, they should face 
a high default sanction in the range of double to treble damages and be 
required to enter into CIAs.  These high default penalties for failing to 
cooperate or meet policing and prevention duties, as well as the additional 
imposition of costly CIAs for noncompliant firms, will serve to increase the 
costs of noncompliance relative to the liability enhancement effects of 
policing and prevention measures.214  These reforms would effectively 
expand and strengthen the use of CIAs and analogous procedures such as 
the HHS-OIG‘s Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, albeit with a more 
concrete and delineated approach that would apply to any FCA corporate 
defendant, not just in the healthcare context.215  The adoption of effective 
and mandatory FCA corporate cooperation guidelines will go a long way 
toward optimizing the FCA‘s enforcement framework. 
C.   Publicly Filed Settlements with Admissions216 
This last reform requires a paradigm shift in the way that the DOJ 
currently approaches resolution and settlement under the FCA.  The DOJ 
should require that all FCA settlements be publicly filed as consent orders 
in federal district court and should require noncooperating corporations to 
admit to violative conduct.217  These provisions will undoubtedly alter the 
enforcement calculus for both potential whistleblowers and corporate 
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defendants, leading to increased cooperation from defendants and a 
decrease in frivolous and marginal qui tam suits in the long term. 
A settlement regime which requires publicly filed settlements and 
admissions of liability undoubtedly raises the stakes for corporate 
defendants.  Publicly filed settlements come with much more stigma, media 
attention, and negative consequences for corporate defendants.218  Where 
corporations fail to meet their policing and prevention duties or do not fully 
cooperate with the government, they should be required to admit to FCA-
violative conduct in any settlement.  These admissions will also engender 
and strengthen follow-on civil litigation brought by private litigants against 
corporate defendants.219  The prospect of reputational harm and follow-on 
litigation provide a higher ―default penalty‖ that effectively increases firms‘ 
expected liability for noncompliance and incentivizes firms to adopt 
policing and prevention measures and to fully cooperate with government 
investigations.220 
The adoption of this settlement regime should also lead to the filing of 
fewer frivolous qui tam actions by the relators‘ bar over the long term.  
Requiring publicly filed settlements with admissions of wrongdoing 
functions as a form of ―merits review‖ that would serve to alleviate 
concerns regarding frivolous and nonmeritorious filings.221  Potential 
whistleblowers and their attorneys who would otherwise file frivolous or 
marginal claims in the hopes of extracting a nuisance settlement will be 
deterred from filing cases where they will need to sufficiently substantiate 
allegations before settlement.  Such a requirement also alters the settlement 
calculus for corporate firms, disincentivizing them from discreetly settling 
marginal or frivolous FCA matters for nuisance value.222  Rather than face 
the added costs of reputational harm and possible follow-on civil litigation, 
corporate defendants will likely choose to litigate a wider cross-section of 
cases.223  And, under the current FCA framework, the DOJ should be able 
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to enforce this settlement regime even in cases in which it declines to 
intervene.224  Faced with the prospect of actually having to litigate and 
bring more marginal cases to trial, the relators‘ bar will be more discerning 
in the quality of cases it pursues.  In the long run, fewer frivolous and 
marginal claims will be filed. 
These requirements will undoubtedly lead to an increase in litigation 
costs for firms in the short-term; however, in the long term, the filing of 
frivolous suits will be deterred and the decrease in litigation costs 
associated with those frivolous cases will serve to offset those initial costs.  
Additionally, the litigation of borderline cases will help to better delineate 
the boundaries of FCA liability for corporate defendants and potential 
relators alike.  Targets of FCA actions will be induced to bring more cases 
to trial that are at the margin, rather than settle and admit to liability.  The 
decisions that courts hand down in these marginal cases will better define 
the boundaries of FCA liability going forward, making corporate 
determinations of whether conduct constitutes a violation easier and more 
concrete, consequently reducing costs associated with the uncertainty of 
whether conduct may give rise to FCA liability. 
CONCLUSION 
The FCA qui tam provisions represent an important and effective tool 
designed to protect the government from fraud.  The evolution of these qui 
tam provisions has had important effects on government-whistleblower and 
government-defendant relationships.  Analyzing the agency costs of these 
relationships provides a principled method for determining the distinct 
advantages and disadvantages involved with qui tam actions.  The DOJ can 
easily take steps to address the potential downsides of qui tam enforcement 
without the need for legislative fixes.  Accordingly, clearly delineating 
incentives for relators and their counsel, formally establishing clear 
guidance for corporations seeking credit for cooperation, and requiring 
publicly filed settlements with accompanying admissions of liability will 
help ameliorate the inefficiencies, and strengthen the benefits, of the FCA 
qui tam provisions. 
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